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Ethics and Uncertainty: In Vitro Fertilization
and Risks to Women's Health
Inmaculada de Melo-Martin*
Introduction
From the 1940's to the early 1970's, doctors gave diethylstilbertrol
(DES) to millions of pregnant women in order to prevent spontaneous
abortions. However, physicians did not have adequate information
about the potential consequences of this hormone's use. Years later,
researchers have found that two to four million daughters of women
who took DES suffer cancer of the vagina and cervix at a rate higher
than that of daughters of women who did not take DES. These women
also have experienced increased rates of infertility, spontaneous
abortions, and ectopic (outside the uterus) pregnancies. Moreover, more
than 30 years after they used the drug, women who took DES suffer
from 40-50% higher rates of breast cancer than women of similar
age.1 The Dalkon Shield case also exemplifies problems in dealing
with medical technologies.The Dalkon Shield, an intrauterine
contraceptive device, was marketed for several years. Between 1970 and
1974, doctors inserted the Dalkon Shield into more than two million
U.S. women and a total of four million worldwide. After women used
it extensively, researchers compiled evidence indicating that severe
hemorrhaging, infected miscarriages, ectopic pregnancies, infertility,
mutilated reproductive organs, and death could result from its use.
Advances in the biomedical sciences are helping to cure diseases,
give children to the infertile, improve the quality of life, and increase
* Dr. de Melo-Martin is an Assistant Professor of Philosophy, St. Mary's
University, San Antonio, TX. Email: demelo@stmarytx.edu.
1 See, e.g., Cynthia Orenberg, DES: The Complete Story (1981); Renate Klein &
Robyn Rowland, Women As Test Sites for Fertility Drugs: Clomiphene Citrate and
Hormonal Cocktails, Reproductive and Genetic Engineering. Journal of International
Feminist Analysis, 1:3 (1988); Harriet Simand, 1938-1988: Fifty Years of DES-Fifty
Years Too Many, The Future of Human Reproduction (Christine Overall ed., 1989);
Robyn Rowland, Living Laboratories (1992); S. M. Fisher & R. J. Apfel,
Diethylstilbestrol and Infertility: The Past, the Present, and the Relevance for the
Future, Technology and Infertility (MacHelle M. Seibel et al. eds., 1993).
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longevity. But some of these biomedical developments are causing
death and injury, and creating public alarm. These developments
confront society with new ethical dilemmas about reproductive rights,
parenthood, medicalization of reproduction, exploitation, consent, and
equity in the distribution of scarce medical resources.
Overview
This paper argues that because of inadequate technology
-assessments, policymakers have made decisions, in relation to in vitro
fertilization (IVF), that may not be in the public's best interests. I
defend the thesis that assessments of IVF are inadequate because, in
neglecting epistemological and ethical problems such as choosing
criteria for decisions under uncertainty, assessors of IVF may encourage
public policies that overlook the possibility of jeopardizing women's
health. A brief description of the IVF procedures and a summary of the
four reports under analysis will help to contextualize the discussion.
Next, I offer an account of the empirical data on IVF risks. I also show
that assessors have neglected or underestimated the evidence on IVF
hazards. Section six argues that evaluators also have undervalued the
insufficiency of investigations on IVF risks. In section seven, I argue
that evaluators have erred in their analysis because, faced with a
situation of uncertainty, they have recommended minimizing false
positives over false negatives. As a consequence, many women may be
exposed to needless risks. Finally, section eight tries to answer some
possible objections against my arguments. One of those objections is
that because evaluators have recommended obtaining written informed
consent from women as a way to overcome problems with risks, their
recommendations undercut concerns about medical threats to women.
A second criticism refers to the fact that interfering with women's
ability to choose a risky technology, such as IVF, might be paternalistic.
IVF: The Medical Technique
According to the National Center of Health Statistics and the
World Health Organization (WHO) between 8-10% of couples in the
industrialized countries have reproductive problems. 2 They
2 See U.S. Congress, Office of Technology Assessment (OTA), Infertility:
Medical and Social Choices (1988); William D. Mosher & William F. Pratt,
Fecundity and Infertility in the United States, (1990); World Health Organization,
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experience difficulties in conceiving children. The factors that most
often contribute to fertility disorders among women are problems in
ovulation, blocked or scarred fallopian tubes, and endometriosis (the
presence in the lower abdomen of tissue from the uterine lining). In
about half of the couples with reproductive problems, there is a
contributing male factor. Among men, most cases of infertility are a
consequence of abnormal or too few sperm. About 1.6% of couples
seeking infertility treatment in industrialized nations participates in
IVF.3 To understand fully the epistemological, social, legal, and
ethical issues that arise with evaluating this technology, I shall first offer
a description of the procedure.
In its most basic case (i.e., the woman undergoing IVF provides her
own eggs, and her husband or partner supplies the sperm) the technique
of IVF consists of several stages. First, doctors stimulate the woman's
ovaries with different hormones to produce multiple oocytes. Next,
they remove the eggs from her ovaries through procedures such as
laparoscopy or ultrasound-guided oocyte retrieval. After preparation of
semen, specialists fertilize the mature eggs in a laboratory dish with the
sperm. If one or more normal looking embryos result, specialists place
them (normally between three and five) in the woman's womb to
enable implantation and possible pregnancy.
4
Recent Advances in Medically Assisted Conception (1992); and 23 Vital and Health
Statistics 19 (1997).
3 Subcommittee on Health and The Environment, Fertility Clinic Services (1992).
4 See M. C. Macnamee & Peter. R. Brinsden, Superovulation Strategies in
Assisted Conception, A Textbook of in Vitro Fertilization and Assisted
Reproductive Technology (Peter R. Brinsden & Paul A. Rainsbury eds., 1992); I.
Calderon & D. Healy, Endocrinology of IVF, Handbook of In Vitro Fertilization
(Alan Trounson & David K Gardner eds., 1993); M. P. Steinkampf & Richard E.
Blackwell, Ovulation Induction, Textbook of Reproductive Medicine (Bruce R. Carr
& Richard E. Blackwell eds., 1993); Edward E. Wallach, Induction of Ovulation:
General Concepts, Reproductive Medicine and Surgery, (Edward E. Wallach &
Howard A. Zacur eds., 1994); E. Y. Adashi, Clomiphene Citrate-Initiated Ovulation:
The State of the Art, Reproductive Medicine and Surgery, (Edward E. Wallach &
Howard A. Zacur eds., 1994); B. Lunenfeld & V. Insler, Human Gonadotropins,
Reproductive Medicine and Surgery, (Edward E. Wallach & Howard A. Zacur eds.,
1994); and Howard A. Zacur & Y. R. Smith, Gonadotropin-Releasing Hormone and
Analogues in Ovulation Induction, Reproductive Medicine and Surgery, (Edward E.
Wallach & Howard A. Zacur eds., 1994).
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The Four Assessments
The new assisted-conception technologies have raised many
challenging ethical and policy issues in recent decades. Decisionmakers,
medical practitioners, scientists, courts, and the public in general are
facing new quandaries that involve controversies among profoundly
held values. When faced with ethical conflicts or complicated technical
issues, policymakers often turn to or create commissions for advice. 5
This has been the case with the new assisted-conception technologies.
Commissions in several countries around the world have issued
reports on IVF and related procedures. 6 The four analyzed in this
essay have special significance for several reasons. The Victorian report
resulted in the first piece of legislation in the world to regulate assisted-
conception techniques such as IVF. The British assessment has been the
single most influential institutional inquiry on reproductive technologies
and is the one that set the agenda for action in other countries. The
Spanish report has been the basis for Law No. 35/1988. This legislation
is one of the most detailed undertaken on the subject of assisted-
conception procedures. It covers artificial insemination, IVF, and
gamete intrafallopian transfer (GIFT). 7 Finally, the U.S. assessment is
the most complete of the four studies analyzed here. It covers the
scientific, legal, economic, and ethical issues surrounding reproductive
problems. Specifically, it evaluates medically assisted conception
(including IVF and GIFT), surgically assisted reproduction, artificial
insemination, basic research supporting reproductive technologies, and
surrogate motherhood.8
New reports and new legislation are been passed in these and other
countries. 9 The analysis of the four reports evaluated here is still
5 See, e.g., Susan S. Connor & Hernan L. Fuenzalida-Puelma, Bioethics: Issues
and Perspectives (1990); Robert Blank, Regulating Reproduction (1990); U.S.
Congress, Office of Technology Assessment, Biomedical Ethics in U.S. Public Policy(1993); and Society's Choices. Social and Ethical Dimensions Making in Biomedicine(Ruth Ellen Bulger et al. eds., 1995).
6 See, e.g., OTA, Infertility, supra note 2; Blanck, supra note 5; Embryo
Experimentation (Peter Singer et al. eds., 1990); and Jennifer Gunning & Veronica
English, Human In Vitro Fertilization (1993).
7 See Comisi6n Especial de Estudio de la Fecundaci6n "In Vitro" y la
Inseminaci6n Artificial Humanas [Special Commission for the Study of Human in
Vitro Fertilization and Artificial Insemination], Informe [Report] (1987).
8 See OTA, Biomedical Ethics in U.S. Public Policy, supra note 5, at 3.
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important because they are, at least in part, responsible for the current
development and use of IVF and related procedures.
The first of the assessments was published in the State of Victoria,
Australia, in 1982. The Committee, under the direction of Louis
Waller, produced three reports over two years, the first of which dealt
specifically with IVF treatment. The Victorian Committee presented
its Interim Report in September 1982, the Report on Donor Gametes
in Vitro Fertilization in August 1983, and the Report on the
Disposition of Embryos Produced by In Vitro Fertilization in August
1984. Following the recommendations of these reports, the Victorian
Government enacted the Infertility (Medical Procedures) Act in
1984.10 This bill sets out the provisions to regulate IVF and associated
technologies. It allows the fertilization of ova outside a woman's body
only for implantation and only for married couples. Counseling is
mandatory. It limits the practice of IVF to approved hospitals and
provides for record keeping and confidentiality.
In July 1982, two months after the appointment of the Victorian
Committee, the British parliament established the Warnock
Committee that produced the Report of the Committee of Inquiry
into Human Fertilization and Embryology. Although both the
Victorian and the British commissions reported their findings in 1984,
the former led to immediate legislation, the latter to an extended
period of consultation. Nevertheless, in 1990 the British parliament
brought about the eventual recommendations of the Warnock proposals
in the Human Fertilization and Embryology Act.1 1 The Act
establishes the statutory licensing of IVF, the donation and storage of
eggs and sperm, and embryo research. It allows licensed research, but it
does not permit the storage or use of embryos beyond fourteen days of
fertilization. The Act also prohibits cloning and the placing of a human
embryo in any other animal. 12
9 See, e.g., Singer, supra note 6; Gunning, supra note 6.
10 See, e.g., Singer, supra note 6; Gunning, supra note 6.
11 See Mary Warnock, A Question of Life. The Warnock Report on Human
Fertilization and Embryology (1985); See also, Blanck, supra note 5, at 143;
Gunning, supra note 6.
12 See Warnock, supra note 11; see also, Blanck, supra note 5, at 143; Gunning,
supra note 5.
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In 1986, the third assessment on new reproductive techniques under
analysis appeared in Spain. The Spanish parliament set up a Special
Commission to study human IVF and artificial insemination. 1 3
Following this report, the parliament passed a law know as Health:
Assisted Reproduction Techniques. The law lays down general
principles for the application of these technologies that emphasize
informed consent, patient data collection and confidentiality,
fertilization of ova for the sole purpose of procreation, and the
minimization of spare embryos.
Finally, in 1988 the U.S. Office of Technology Assessment (OTA)
issued its report entitled, Infertility: Medical and Social Choices. This
assessment seems to have triggered the proposal of a federal law relating
to IVF. After several hearings in 1988 and 1989,14 the U.S. Congress
enacted the Fertility Clinic Success Rate and Certification Act of
1992.15 This Act requires all infertility clinics that perform IVF
services to communicate annually their pregnancy success rates to the
Secretary of Health and Human Services. It also requires the identity of
each embryo-laboratory working in association with the clinic. The Act
also directs the Secretary to develop a model program for state
certification of embryo laboratory accreditation programs. In addition,
it demands that the Secretary publish and disseminate data concerning
pregnancy success rates and other related information. The Centers for
Disease Control and Prevention is in charge of the development of the
actual mechanisms for the implementation of the Act. 16
13 See Spanish Commission, supra note 7.
14 See Subcommittee on Regulation and Business Opportunities, Consumer
Protection Issues Involving In Vitro Fertilization Clinics (1988) (hereinafter SRE,
Consumer); Subcommittee on Regulation, Business Opportunities and Energy
Consumer Protection Issues Involving In Vitro Fertilization Clinics (1989)
(hereinafter SRBE, Clinics).
15 See Subcommittee on Health and The Environment, supra note 3; Fertility
Clinic Success Rate and Certification Act of 1992 H.R. Rep. No. 102-624 (1992);
and U.S. Senate, Firtility Clinic Success Rate and Certification Act of 1992 S. Rep.
No. 102-452 (1992).
16 See Society for Assisted Reproductive Technology, American Society for
Reproductive Medicine, Assisted Reproductive Technology in the United States and
Canada: 1993 Results Generated from the American Society for Reproductive
Medicine! Society for Assisted Reproductive Technology Registry, 64 Fertility and
Sterility 1 (1995); and Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, Assisted
Reproductive Technology Success Rate in the United States: 1995 National Summary
and Fertility Clinic Report (1997).
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The main goal of these four committees was to provide direction
for public policy in relation to IVF and other associated technologies.
Unlike the Victorian, the British, and the Spanish studies, the U.S.
report does not offer recommendations. Its main purpose is, however,
similar to that of the other studies: to help legislative policymakers by
providing information about the new reproductive technologies.
The main conclusions of these IVF assessments are analogous,
although there are areas of disagreement. For married or stable couples,
all of the reports conclude that artificial insemination and IVF are
legitimate medical responses to infertility but that informed consent is
a precondition for treatment. They argue that some forms of embryo
research, such as cloning, clearly are unacceptable. However, others
forms of embryo research are permissible within the first fourteen days
of development in vitro, provided that ethics committees regulate and
approve them. Commissioners also agree that governments should
allow the donation of embryos. Similarly, the reports concur that
governments should regularize the legal status of children conceived
through the new reproductive technologies. They also emphasize the
need to establish some form of national accreditation or licensing for
assisted-conception clinics.
Underestimating IVF Risks
The issue of whether women undergoing IVF may be exposed to
serious risks is important not only for scientific reasons, but also basic
ethical, political, and social ones. Assessment of the existing scientific
evidence on IVF safety and efficiency is therefore crucial in order to
provide input to policymakers. In this section, I offer a brief account of
the data on IVF risks. Next, I argue that evaluators on the four
commissions seem to have underestimated the importance of IVF
hazards.
IVF Risks
According to empirical evidence, risks to women undergoing IVF
treatment vary from simple nausea to death. For example, the
hormones that doctors use to stimulate the ovaries are associated with
numerous side effects. Some studies assert that ovulation induction
may be a risk factor for certain types of hormone dependent cancers.
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Researchers have associated excessive estrogen secretion with ovarian
and breast carcinoma, and gonadotropin secretion with ovarian
cancer. 1 7 A substantial body of experimental, clinical, and
epidemiological evidence indicates that hormones play a major role in
the development of several human cancers. 18 The ability of hormones
to stimulate cell division in certain organs, such as the breast,
endometrium, and the ovary, may lead (following repeated cell
divisions) to the accumulation of random genetic errors that ultimately
produce cancer. Hormone-related cancers account for more than 30%
of all newly diagnosed female cancer in the U.S. 19 Hence, techniques
such as IVF, that rely on massive doses of hormones, may be quite
dangerous.
The ovarian hyperstimulation syndrome (OHSS) is another possible
iatrogenic (caused by medical treatment) consequence of ovulation
induction. Women with the severe form of OHSS may suffer renal
impairment, liver dysfunction, thromboembolic phenomena, shock,
and even death. The incidence of moderate and severe OHSS in IVF
treatment ranges from 3-4%. An incidence of 3-4% is high,
considering IVF is a selective procedure that treats a non-life-
threatening condition. Moreover, this syndrome is extremely rare
following natural conception. 20
17 See, e.g., John Jarrel et al., Adverse Health Effects of Drugs Used for
Ovulation Induction, New Reproductive Technologies and the Health Care System.
The Case for Evidence-Based Medicine, Royal Commission on New Reproductive
Technologies (1993); Patricia Stephenson, Ovulation Induction During Treatment of
Infertility: An Assessment of the Risks, Tough Choices, (Patricia Stephenson &
Marsden G. Wagner eds., 1993); A. Brzezinski, et al, Ovarian Stimulation and Breast
Cancer: Is There a Link? 52 Gynecol. Oncol. 3 (1994); and R. E. Bristow & B. Y.
Karlan, The Risk of Ovarian Cancer after Treatment for Infertility, 8 Curt. Opin.
Obstet. Gynecol. 1 (1996).
18 See, e.g., S. Fishel & P. Jackson, Follicle Stimulation for High-Tech
Pregnancies: Are We Playing It Safe? 299 British Med J. 309 (1989); Stephenson,
supra note 17, at 105.
19 See, e.g., H. P. Schneider & M. Birkhauser, Does Hormone Replacement
Therapy Modify Risks of Gynecological Cancers? 40 Int. J. Fertil. Menopausal
Studies suppl. 1 (1995); T. J. Key, Hormones and Cancer in Humans, 333 Mutat.
Res 1 (1995); F. Berrino et al., Serum Sex Hormone Levels after Menopause and
Subsequent Breast Cancer, 88 J. Natl. Cancer Inst. 5 (1996).
20 See, e.g., B. Rizk, Ovarian Hyperstimulation Syndrome, A Textbook of in
Vitro Fertilization and Assisted Reproductive Technology, (Peter R. Brinsden &
Paul A. Rainsbury eds., 1992); I. Calderon & D. Healy, Endocrinology of IVF,
Handbook of In Vitro Fertilization, (A. Trounson & D. K. Gardner eds.,1993); M.
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Procedures doctors normally use to obtain women's eggs, i.e.,
laparoscopy and ultrasound-guide oocyte retrieval also pose risks to
them. Although there is no accurate statistical data about hazards
associated with these two procedures, risks related to these technologies
include postoperative infections, punctures of an internal organ,
hemorrhages, ovarian trauma, and intrapelvic adhesions. 2 1
Furthermore, intrapelvic adhesions can exacerbate preexisting infertility
or cause it in healthy women who undergo IVF treatments when their
male partners have reproductive difficulties. 2 2 Thus IVF could
increase or produce the very problem for which women use it as
treatment.
Implantation of embryos or gametes into women's bodies also may
be hazardous for them. Some of the possible risks are perforation of
organs and ectopic pregnancies. Studies show that 5-7% of all IVF
pregnancies implant outside the uterus. 23 That hazard in the general
population, however, is approximately 1%.24 Ectopic gestations may
be life-threatening for the woman and can aggravate infertility.2 5
P. Steinkampf & Richard E. Blackwell, Ovulation Induction, Textbook of
Reproductive Medicine (Bruce R. Carr & Richard E. Blackwell eds., 1993);
Stephenson, supra note 17; J. G. Schenker & Y. Ezra, Complication of Assisted
Reproductive Techniques, 16 Fertility and Sterility 3 (1994); and J. G. Schenker,
Ovarian Hyperstimulation Syndrome, Reproductive Medicine and Surgery (Edward
E. Wallach & Howard A. Zacur eds., 1994).
21 See, e.g., Rowland, supra note 1, at 325-30; Lene Koch, Physiological and
Psychosocial Risks of the New Reproductive Technologies, Tough Choices (Patricia
Stephenson & Marsden G. Wagner eds., 1993); and P. J. Taylor & J. V. Kredentser,
Diagnostic and Therapeutic Laparoscopy and Hysteroscopy and Their Relationship
to in Vitro Fertilization, A Textbook of in Vitro Fertilization and Assisted
Reproductive Technology (Peter R. Brinsden & Paul A. Rainsbury eds., 1992).
22 See Peter R. Brinsden, Oocyte Recovery and Embryo Transfer Techniques for
in Vitro Fertilization, A Textbook of in Vitro Fertilization and Assisted
Reproductive Technology (Peter R. Brinsden & Paul A. Rainsbury eds., 1992);
Rowland, supra note 1, at 25; Koch, supra note 21.
23 Medical Research Institute, Society of Assisted Reproductive Technology, The
American Fertility Society, In Vitro Fertilization! Embryo Transfer in the United
States: 1988 Results from the National IVF-ET Registry, Fertility and Sterility
(1990)
24 See 0. K. Davis & Z. Rosenwaks, Assisted Reproductive Technology,
Textbook of Reproductive Medicine (Bruce R. Carr & Richard E. Blackwell eds.,
1993); See also, S. F. Marcus & Peter R. Brinsden, Analysis of the Incidence and
Risk Factors Associated with Ectopic Pregnancy Following In Vitro Fertilization and
Embryo Transfer, Human Reproduction (1994).
25 See Brinsden, supra note 22; Rowland, supra note 1, at 30-32; Koch, supra
note 21.
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Likewise, multiple gestation occurs in about 25% of IVF
pregnancies, 2 6 while it has an incidence of only 2% in the general
population. 2 7 Multiple-birth pregnancies increase the danger of
miscarriages, cesarean sections, early labor, and placental dysfunction.
The Assessments' Treatment ofEvidence on 1VF Risks
In spite of the significance of data on IVF risks, particularly those
related to cancer, evaluators on the four commissions seem to have
undervalued this information. In the Victorian and the British reports
discussion about the known and suspected dangers of IVF is
insignificant. They describe the steps of the procedure without referring
to possible associated hazards. For instance, when addressing ovulation
induction (a step in IVF), the Victorian report argues that using fertility
drugs to stimulate the ovaries during IVF treatments seems "reasonable
since pregnancy often followed the use of fertility drugs in women who
were not ovulating." 2 8 According to this report, having ovarian
stimulation therapy is almost routine for treating women who undergo
IVF. 2 9 Despite the cancer risks, there is no mention, however, of any
possible hazards associated with such a therapy. Similarly, the British
report presents the use of ovarian stimulation as "very desirable" because
it allows the transfer of more than one embryo to the woman's uterus
and thus increases the chances of obtaining a pregnancy. 30 Like the
Victorian assessment, here there is no discussion whatsoever about
cancer risks associated with ovulation-induction drugs.
The Spanish report, on the other hand, does allude to some of the
dangers associated with IVF. Nevertheless, it refers to them as "scarce
but existent."3 1 After this characterization, there is a succinct reference
to some of the risks related to IVF. Assessors say that there are some
26 See, e.g., World Health Organization (WHO), Recommendations on the
Management of Services for in Vitro Fertilization from the WHO 1990, British
Medical Journal (July 25, 1992); and Stephenson, supra note 17, at 100.
27 See, e.g., Stephenson, supra note 17, at 100; and S. Brownlee, The Baby
Chase: Milions of Couples Have Infertility Problems, and Many Try High-Tech
Remedies. But Who Minds the Price Clinics They Turn to?, News and World
Report (Dec. 5, 1994).
28 Committee to Consider the Social, Ethical, and Legal Issues Arising from In
Vitro Fertilization, Interim Report (1982).
29 Id. at 9.
30 Warnock, supra note 11, at 30-31.
31 Spanish Commission, supra note 7, at 107.
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hazards "derived from overstimulation of the ovaries." 32 They fail to
mention, however, what those risks are. Next, they say that there are
some dangers "derived from general anesthesia, and generated from the
surgical procedures used to obtain the eggs, including infections." 3 3
There is no reference to what kinds of risks are associated with the
techniques employed for the retrieval of oocytes or the type of
infections these procedures may cause. Evaluators also refer to the risks
"derived from multiple-births pregnancies." 3 4 They say that these
kinds of gestations may "produce triplets, quadruplets, etc., with the
related obstetric problems (for the woman and children), pediatrics (for
the children), and psychological (for the couple). "35 Again, evaluators
fail to mention specific obstetric or pediatric risks, such as use of
caesarian sections, early labor, and low-birthweight children that are
associated with multiple births.
The U.S. study offers more information about IVF risks than the
other reports. It describes some of the potential hazards associated with
IVF and related techniques. The U.S. assessment mentions risks
produced by the use of fertility drugs such as hyperstimulation, hazards
derived from the utilization of techniques to retrieve oocytes such as
blood in urine, and dangers attributable to the embryo-transfer
procedure such as trauma to the endometrium. 36 It also refers to the
fact that "transferred embryos may implant in the fallopian tube"3 7
Furthermore, the report says that "the miscarriage rate for infertility
patients is generally higher than that for the normal population." 3 8
And that "preterm delivery is more common in pregnancies after IVF
than in spontaneous pregnancies." 39 The U.S. study fails to mention,
however, any data about cancer risks. When summarizing the main
points of the chapter, the report neglects to mention any information at
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Overlooking the Insufficiency of Data on IVF Risks
Apart from overlooking or underestimating the known risks
associated with IVF and related procedures, the commissions also have
undervalued the importance of the deficiencies in the existing research
and the significance of the scarcity of good investigations on IVF
hazards. Assessors seem to have failed to take into account what experts
do not know about IVF and related techniques. For instance, evaluators
neglect the fact that there is insufficient evidence concerning the long-
term effects, such as ovarian and breast cancer, of ovulation-induction
drugs in women. Although they recognize the need for improvement in
IVF and related procedures, neither the Victorian, the British, nor the
Spanish reports pay attention to the lack of studies on hazards
associated with IVF. Only the U.S. assessment mentions the scarcity of
research on maternal health consequences and anomalies in
offspring. 4 1 It does not concede, however, particular significance to
this lack of evidence.
Today, more than ten years after the presentation of the first IVF
reports (the British and the Victorian), there is a lack of scientifically
valid information obtained from clinical trials and other
epidemiological investigations on IVF and related techniques. A study
conducted in 1993 by the Canadian Royal Commission on New
Reproductive Technologies shows that comprehensive evaluations of
costs, benefits, risks, and efficiency are still necessary. Systematic data
collection is lacking because no organization or agency gathers
information on IVF outcomes. For the same reason, little or no follow-
up data exist on what happens to children and women after the
pregnancies. Record-keeping practices vary markedly among clinics and
practitioners, with some clinics not recording data on whether a
particular IVF procedure resulted in a live birth.42 Moreover, because
physicians still do not report all adverse health effects of the ovulation-
induction drugs that doctors use in IVF treatment, identification of
short-term and long-term risks associated with exposure is difficult.
40 Id.
41 Id.
42 See SRB, Consumer, supra note 14; SRBE, Clinics, supra note 14; SHE,
Fertility, supra note 3; and Royal Commission on New Reproductive Technologies,
Proceed with Care (1993).
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Insufficient information about the type of reproductive problem,
hormones used, dosage, and duration of infertility treatment make it
arduous to assess the impacts of these drugs. Likewise, because of the
long latency period of cancer, early detection of the disease is
difficult. 4 3 Despite the evidence that shows hormones play an
important role in the development of ovarian and breast cancer, the
overall picture indicates that researchers have displayed very limited
interest in investigating the frequency, mechanisms, or impact of the
negative health consequences of ovulatibn-induction therapy.
Investigators have never properly evaluated hormone and IVF-
related drugs prior to their introduction into clinical practice. Their
omission is serious. In the past, disastrous consequences have followed
from the use of drugs, pesticides, and technologies prior to their
assessment. In addition to DES and the Dalkon Shield cases, other
instances illustrating the danger of a "use first, evaluate later" practice
are the utilization of the pesticide DDT and the implementation of
commercial nuclear fission. For example, after years of using DDT,
scientists found that this pesticide had the paradoxical consequence of
producing a greater pest problem than the one it was supposed to
combat. This is because evolution selects for pesticide-resistant insects.
The new, stronger insects are more lethal and require more powerful
pesticides, which in turn lead to increasing threats to humans and to
even more resistant insects.44 Commercial nuclear fission constitutes
another example of implementation of a technology prior to its
assessment. Nuclear power has been used for decades in spite of our
ignorance of the dangers of low-level nuclear radiation, our knowledge
of the probabilities of core melt, and our inability to give a guarantee
that disposing of nuclear waste will not harm future generations. 4 5
43 See Royal Commission on New Reproductive Technologies, New Reproductive
Technologies and the Health Care System. The Case for Evidence-Based Medicine(1993) (hereinafter RCNRT, Evidence-Based Medicine); See also, SRB, Consumer,
supra note 14, at 30-32; SRBE, Clinics, supra note 14; SHE, Fertility, supra note 3;
FinoaJ. Stanley & Sandra M. Webb, The Effectiveness of in Vitro Fertilization: An
Epidemiological Perspective, Tough Choices (Patricia Stephenson & Marsden G.
Wagner eds., 1993); and WHO, Recommendations, supra note 1, at 251.
44 See, e.g., Rachel Carson, Silent Spring (1962); The Environmental Crisis (N.
Bernard 1991); Kristen Shrader-Frechette, Pesticide Toxicity: An Ethical Perspective,
Environmental Ethics (1991).
45 See, e.g., Kristen Shrader-Frechette, Nuclear Power and Public Policy (1980);
N. Lenssen, Nuclear Waste: The Problem That Won't Go Away, State of the World
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Likewise, after 30 years of using ovulation-induction hormones, and
despite the strong correlation between hormones and cancer, sound
investigations of their adverse consequences still are scarce. 4 6 In
comparison, investigators have extensively reviewed drugs administered
for chemotherapy and cardiac arrhythmia for their side effects.
According to the Canadian study, however, the potential for adverse
health consequences in young women using these ovulation-induction
drugs is as great as, or greater than, that associated with the treatment
of cancer or heart disease. 47 The differences in the investigations of the
health impacts of various medications and techniques force one to
wonder whether unfair discrimination against women has played a role
in the inadequate attention given to the analysis of ovulation-induction
drugs. Discrimination has already occurred in other areas of biomedical
science, as research into cardiovascular disease illustrates. Although
heart trouble is the leading cause of death of women in the U.S.,
cardiac research has concentrated almost entirely on men. Similarly, an
investigation demonstrating the effectiveness of aspirin in preventing
migraine headaches involved only male subjects, although women
outnumber male migraine sufferers three to one.4 8
Assessment, of both the available scientific evidence and the
insufficiency of data on IVF risks, is essential to provide information to
guide public policy. Assessors have undervalued both areas. By
underestimating hazards and the insufficiency of information on
dangers, evaluators erroneously have presented this technology as safe.
They seem to have assumed that because the evidence has not proved
IVF to be risky, then the procedure is safe. Assessors have, therefore,
overlooked a third possibility: that IVF threats are uncertain.
(Lester R. Brown ed., 1992); and Kristen Shrader-Frechette, Burying Uncertainty
(1993) (hereinafter Shrader-Frechette, Burying).
46 C. D'Arcy et al., Infertility Treatment--Epidemiology, Efficacy, Outcomes, and
Direct Costs: A Feasibility Study, Saskatcheman 1978-1990, Evidence-Based
Medicine, RCNRT 765.
47 Jarrel et al, supra note 17, at 520.
48 See, e.g., Hilde Lindemann Nelson & James Lindemann Nelson, Justice in the
Allocation of Health Care Resources: A Feminist Account, Feminist and Bioethics
(Susan M. Wolf ed., 1996), at 351-370 (hereinafter Lindemann Nelson, Justice). See
also, The Special Report On Women ' Health Research, 269 Science (Anna C.
Mastronianni et al. eds., August 11, 1995); Women and Health Research: Ethical and
Legal Issues of Including Women in Clinical Studies (hereinafter Mastronianni et al.,
Women and Health Research).
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Ethical Alternatives Under Uncertainty
We are forced to make numerous decisions every day. In some
cases they are thoughtful, while others are the result only of habit.
Because the consequences of our choices affect our lives, we try to make
good decisions. However, the conditions under which we have to
choose are not always similar. Thus, we may face situations of certainty,
risk, and uncertainty. In a situation of certainty we know that a choice
will result in a particular outcome. For example, if we use cars that burn
gas then we are certain to have the outcome of producing C02. In
conditions of risk, we know, with a specific probability, whether a
choice will result in a given outcome. For instance, when rolling a fair
die, we know the particular probability of obtaining a "five." Finally,
situations of uncertainty occur when we have partial or total ignorance
about whether a choice will result in a given outcome with an assigned
probability. For example, if using ovulation-induction hormones, we
have partial ignorance about whether such a choice will result in the
probability that at least 10,000 women undergoing IVF treatment will
die because of reproductive cancers in a time period of 30 years
following the procedure.4 9
Decisions under conditions of certainty and risk are relatively
unproblematic because we can attach specific probabilities to given
outcomes. Uncertainty situations, however, present more difficulties for
decisions because probabilities of particular outcomes are unknown.
Because of limited data, questionable theories, or problems of
theoretical underdetermination by the evidence, much scientific
research is uncertain. 5 0 Given this uncertainty in science, most
technology-related decision making takes place in situations of limited
knowledge. People rarely have complete, accurate knowledge of all the
probabilities associated with various outcomes of taking technological
risks (e.g., ovulation-induction drugs, laparoscopy, ultrasound), because
very risky technologies are often new.
49 See, e.g., Kristen Shrader-Frechette, Risk and Rationality (1991) (hereinafter
Shrader-Frechette, Risk).
50 See, e.g., Norwood R. Hanson, Patterns of Discovery (1958); M. Polanyi,
Personal Knowledge (1958) Karl R Popper, The Logic of Scientific Discovery (1959);
Karl R. Popper, Conjectures and Refutations (1963); Carl Hempel, Philosophy of
Natural Sciences (1966); Thomas Kuhn, The Structure of Scientific Revolutions
(1970).
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False Positives and False Negatives
Consider the case of evaluators who must assess the uncertain
consequences of implementing a new technology, such as IVF, to treat
infertility. Because the decision may have serious social, economic, and
political consequences, analysts must determine what particular criteria
to use to know how to interpret the uncertain results. For instance, if
they overemphasize the risks that this new technique may pose to
women, the community (e.g., industry and those who are infertile) may
ear serious losses because of governments' restricting use and
expansion of IVF. If, on the other hand, assessors underemphasize the
dangers, many women (those who use IVF) could suffer significant
health problems or even death. Thus, because of the uncertainties in
scientific information, when analysts reach their conclusions about
implementation or regulation of a new technology, they must decide
whether minimizing false positives is better or worse than minimizing
false negatives, when both are not possible.
In a situation of uncertainty, false positives (type-I errors) occur
when one rejects a null hypothesis that is true; false negatives (type-II
errors) occur when one fails to reject a null hypothesis that is false. (An
example of a null hypothesis might be, "IVF does not pose a
statistically-significant increased risk of death to women over a ten-year
period after the use of the technique.") 5 1 In assessing technological
impacts under conditions of uncertainty, assessors must then decide
whether to run the risks of rejecting a true null hypothesis (not using or
expanding IVF when it is really safe and effective), or run the risks of
not rejecting a false null hypothesis (using or expanding IVF when it is
really unsafe and inefficient). Thus in situations of uncertainty, if
evaluators minimize false positives when analyzing IVF, they minimize
the possibility of restricting a harmless technology. On the other hand,
if they decide to minimize false negatives, they minimize the error of
accepting a harmful procedure. Under conditions of uncertainty,
decreasing the risks of false positives might result in underregulation of
IVF and related techniques and therefore may hurt women's health. To
minimize risks of false negatives might, however, produce
51 See, e.g., Shrader-Frechette, Risk, supra note 49, at ch. 9; C. F. Cranor,
Regulating Toxic Substances (1993); Kristen Shrader-Frechette, Ethics of Scientific
Research (1994).
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overregulation. This strategy may impose excessive costs on
manufacturers of IVF, and may hurt infertile people who want to use
the technology. 52
Preferences for minimizing false positives in situations of
uncertainty may arise for several reasons. 53 Minimizing false positives,
for example, appears more consistent with scientific practice.
Hypothesis-testing in science functions on the basis of limiting false
positives or limiting rejections of a true null hypothesis. The
justification for this strategy seems to be that keeping the chances of
rejecting a true null hypothesis low, researchers try to ensure an increase
in scientific knowledge. Attempting to minimize false positives under
conditions of uncertainty is also a common practice in criminal cases. In
the criminal law the jury must be sure beyond a reasonable doubt that a
defendant is guilty before convicting him. This is the basis for the idea
that it is better for ten guilty people to go free rather than for one
innocent person to be wrongly convicted.
Similarly, preferences for minimizing false positives in situations of
uncertainty may arise because technical experts almost always use
widely accepted Bayesian decision rules based on expected utility and
subjective probabilities rather than the maximin principle. 54 As a
result, even if everybody agrees that the probability of a high-
consequence effect is uncertain but low, utilizing a Bayesian decision
rule usually produces a choice in favor of the low-probability, but
potentially-catastrophic, technological impact. In the same case,
however, employing a maximin decision rule typically produces a
conclusion against an uncertain but potentially dangerous consequence.
Assessors' sanction of IVF use seems to indicate a preference for
52 Shrader-Frechette, Risk, supra note 49, at ch. 9; Cranor, Regulating, supra note
51; and Shrader-Frechette, Research, supra note 51, at ch. 6. See also, C. W.
Churchman, Theory of Experimental Inference (1947).
53 See, e.g., Shrader-Frechette, Risk, supra note 49, at ch. 9; and Cranor,
Regulating, supra note 51, at chs. 2, 4.
54 See, e.g., Shrader-Frechette, Risk, supra note 49, at ch. 8; and Shrader-
Frechette, Research, supra note 51 at ch. 6; See also, John Harsanyi, Can the
Maximin Principle Serve as a Basis for Morality? A Critique ofJohn Rawls's Theory,
69 American Political Science Review 2 (1975); John Harsanyi, Understanding
Rational Behavior, Foundational Problems in the Special Sciences (R. E. Butts &
Jaakko Hintikka eds., 1977); John Harsanyi, Advances in Understanding Rational
Behavior, Rational Choice (Jon Elster ed., 1986); and John Rawls, A Theory of
Justice (1971); See also, Michael Resnick, Choices (1986).
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maximizing expected-utility rather than for using maximin. Thus,
although the case of IVF is one of uncertainty with potentially
dangerous consequences, evaluators have condoned the extensive use
and expansion of the technique.
In the next section, I argue that in a case of uncertainty, such as that
regarding the consequences of employing IVF, there are prima facie
grounds for minimizing false negatives because underestimating the
risks of this procedure may have disastrous consequences for women's
health and well being.
Arguments for Minimizing False Negatives
when Assessing IVF
There are several reasons for holding that, in situations of scientific
uncertainty such as that of implementing IVF, assessors have a prima
facie duty to minimize false negatives. 55 First, protecting the public
from serious harm usually takes precedence over enhancing its welfare.
Second, groups that are especially vulnerable need special protection. I
treat these reasons in order.
First, protecting people justifies minimizing false judgments that a
potentially damaging technology such as IVF is harmless. Most
political theorists would agree that protecting the public from serious
harm (e.g., cancer and death) takes precedence over enhancing its
welfare (e.g., by permitting wide IVF development). 5 6 The
justification (for preferring to prevent harm rather than to enhance
welfare under conditions of uncertainty when both are not possible) is
that protecting from harm appears to be a necessary condition for
enjoying other freedoms. Thus, most political theorists would agree
that individuals are responsible for obtaining their particular
enjoyments, whereas the main responsibility of governments should be
protecting from harm.5 7 Also, health-care professionals often invoke
55 See Shrader-Frechette, Risk, supra note 49, at ch. 9; Cranor, Regulating supra
note 51; and Shrader-Frechette, Research, supra note 51, at ch. 6.
56 See Jeremy Bentham, Principles of Civil Code, The Works of Jeremy Bentham
(John Bowring ed., 1962) (hereinafter Bentham, Principles); William Frankena,
Ethics (1973); Michael A. Slote, The Morality of Wealth, World Hunger and Moral
Obligation, (William Aiken & Hugh LaFollette eds., 1977); RCNRT, Care, supra
note 4, at ch. 15; Peter Singer, Practical Ethics (1993); and Tom L. Beauchamp &
James F. Childress, Principles of Biomedical Ethics (4th ed. 1994).
57 See, e.g., Beauchamp, Principles, supra note 56; and Frankena, Ethics, supra
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the Hippocratic maxim: "Above all do no harm", to exemplify the need
to protect patients against harmful actions.
Protecting women against risks to their health posed by IVF is a
case of protection from harm rather than an enhancement of welfare,
because risks to health are harms. As we have seen, women who undergo
the IVF procedure may be exposed to serious hazards such as cancer
and death. Obviously, women have rights to bodily security. But
assessors of IVF have underestimated the existing scientific evidence
and the insufficiency of data on IVF risks. Studies also show that it is
likely that infertility doctors underemphasize uncertainty regarding this
procedure because, in general, physicians tend to disregard uncertainty
in their practices. 58 Thus because womens lack of information may
hinder their abilities to give free informed consent, using techniques
that might cause cancer and death could jeopardize women's rights to
bodily security.
Similarly, IVF induced disease and disability may restrict the range
of opportunities individuals have opened to them.5 9 Illness also may
limit appreciation of other enjoyments. Employing drugs and
procedures that may imperil women's health may then disrupt their
general well-being. Therefore, in underestimating the risks of a
technology that may produce death and illness, assessors have failed to
protect against loss of a good, namely women"s health and well being.
Thus, they have failed to prevent harm. Someone might argue that
restricting IVF is not a case of preventing harm because women want it,
and choosers do not select to harm themselves. However, because
women lack information on IVF risks and benefits, we cannot say that
they really choose to undergo IVF treatment. Therefore, restricting use
of IVF is a case of protecting from harm, because women are not
adequately informed.
Granted, permitting the implementation of IVF may constitute a
case of enhancing welfare for some people (those who might be able to
have children through the procedure). However, the success rate of IVF
note 56.
58 See, e.g., Jay Katz, Why Doctors Don't Disclose Uncertainty, 14 The Hastings
Center Report 1 (1984); RCNRT, Care, supra note 42, at 545-48, and R. L. Logan,
Uncertainy in Clinical Practice: Implications for Quality and Costs of Health Care,
Lancet, e47 (1996).59 See, e.g., Norman Daniels, just Health Care (1998).
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is quite low (around 10%), cancer and death may be some of the
outcomes, the uncertainties about possible risks are great, and there are
other medical and preventive alternatives to IVF. Therefore, protecting
women against risks to their health posed by IVF is more a case of
protecting from harm than of enhancing welfare. Thus, if protecting
from harm (such as illness and death) is more important than providing
some good (such as having babies) then, in situations of uncertainty
with potentially dangerous consequences, IVF assessors should
minimize false negatives.
A second reason for limiting false negatives in situations of
uncertainty, is that women historically are a vulnerable group. Even
when women decide to undergo IVF treatment, they may be helpless
because they lack adequate information on IVF risks and benefits.
Women are vulnerable when facing medical problems and need
more protection because they often lack financial resources (they have
less access to the job market than men and are often more financially
dependent than men). They are vulnerable because frequently they lack
information to deal with dangers that may affect them, as cases such as
the implementation of DES, the Dalkon Shield, and Thalidomide
show.6 0 Furthermore, infertility generates a grave problem for women
because they often accept the belief that childbearing is necessary for a
satisfactory life. 6 1 As a consequence, they are particularly vulnerable,
for they are less likely to be concerned about risks to their lives if they
think they will have a chance of becoming mothers.
Women's vulnerability and their need for protection is also apparent
when observing unjust discrimination against women in the provision of
health care and in health research. For example, recent studies indicate
that when women experience renal failure, they receive fewer kidney
transplants than men. Females between the ages of 46 and 60 are only
half as likely to receive a transplant as males of the same age.6 2
60 See Shrader-Frechette, Risk, supra note 49, at ch. 9; Beauchamp, Principles,
supra note 56, at chs. 4-5; and Shrader-Frechette, Research, supra note 51, at ch. 6.
61 See, e.g., Rita Arditti et al., Test-Tube Women. What Future for Motherhood
(1984); Barbara K Rothman, Recreating Motherhood. Ideology and Technology in a
Patriarchal Society (1990); Motherhood. Meanings, Practices, and Ideologies (Ann
Phoenix et al. eds., 1991); Mardy S. Ireland, Reconceiving Women (1993); and Rosie
Jackson, Mothers Who Leave (1994).
62 See Lindemann Nelson, supra note 48, at 359.
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Similarly, a study completed in 1987 showed that, all things being
equal, men were 6.5 times as likely to be referred for cardiac
catheterization (a prerequisite for coronary bypass surgery) than
women, although men have only three times the likelihood of having
coronary heart disease. 6 3 Medical research practices such as
involuntary sterilization, hysterectomy, mastectomy, and high rates for
cesarean births also show the necessity to protect women. 64 Women
are also particularly vulnerable because of the predominance of males in
the biomedical sciences. Medicine has historically excluded women
and, still today, women constitute a minority in the hierarchy of this
profession. Such exclusion may increase the chances of patronizing,
unperceptive, and harmful attitudes toward female patients, including
those using IVF. 65
Because of the vulnerability of women in relation to medical issues
in general, and reproductive problems in particular, IVF assessors have a
prima facie duty to try to protect them from harms associated with this
procedure. Therefore, evaluators have a prima facie duty to limit false
negatives, given that doing so would likely protect women.
If assessors have a prima facie duty to minimize false negatives
under conditions of uncertainty, then evaluators' decision to minimize
false positives (in a situation of uncertainty having potentially dangerous
consequences) is questionable. This preference is problematic because
evaluators may have encouraged public policies that underestimate the
possibilities of jeopardizing women's heath. For example, because
decisionmakers might think that IVF does not pose serious risks for
women, they might refrain from implementing stricter regulations in its
application. They also may neglect the fact that a more adequate
assessment of these technologies may be in order. Similarly, because
they might assume that IVF is a safe treatment, policymakers might
avoid or restrict funding for research about it as an infertility therapy.
63 See J. N. Tobin et al., Sex Bias in Considering Coronary Bypass Surgery,107
Annals of International Medicine (1987); R. M. Steingart et al., Sex Differences in
the Management of Coronary Artery Disease, 325 New England Journal of Medicine
(1991); and Lindemann Nelson, supra note 48, at 359.
64 See, e.g., Committee on Labor and Human Resources, Women's Health:
Ensuring Quality and Equityin Biomedical Research (1992); and Mastronianni et al.,
Women and Health Research, supra note 48.
65 See, e.g., Mary A. Warren, Is IVF Research a Threat to Women's Autonomy?
Embryo Experimentation (Peter Singer et al. eds., 1990).
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Some Objections and Responses
There are several objections that critics may pose to my analysis of
IVF assessments. First, they may argue that evaluators have
recommended obtaining written informed consent from women as a
way to overcome problems with risks. Second, critics may claim that
assessors' sanction of the use and expansion of IVF under conditions of
uncertainty is adequate because restricting the use of this procedure
would interfere with women's abilities to choose a risky technology,
and such interference would be paternalistic. I treat these two objections
in order.
Free Informed Consent as a Way to Overcome Problems with Risks
The first criticism of my analysis of IVF assessments (that
evaluators have recommended obtaining written informed consent
from women as a way to overcome problems with risks) seems
particularly compelling because it emphasizes the requirement of
informed consent. I argue, however, that this objection is questionable
because it ignores the fact that if women lack adequate information
about IVF risks and benefits, then they cannot give genuinely informed
consent.
Legal, regulatory, medical, psychological, and philosophical
literature tend to evaluate informed consent in terms of the following
analytical components: (1) disclosure; (2) understanding; (3)
voluntariness; and (4) competence. 6 6 Scholars argue that one gives
informed consent to an intervention if and only if one is competent to
act, receives a thorough disclosure about the procedure, understands the
disclosure, acts voluntarily, and consents to the intervention. Disclosure,
the main component of consent (from an institutional point of view),
refers to the necessity of professionals' passing on information to
decisionmakers and possible risk victims. Understanding, the second
element in the process of obtaining free informed consent, requires
professionals to help potential risk victims overcome illness,
66 See, e.g., A. M. & L. H. Roth, What We Do and Do Not Know About
Informed Consent, 246 J.A.M.A. 21 (1981); U.S. President's Commission for the
Study of the Ethical Problems in Medicine and Biomedical and Behavioral Research,
Making Health Care Decisions: A Report on the Ethical and Legal Implications of
Informed Consent in the Patient-Practitioner Relationship (1982); Ruth Faden &
Tom L. Beauchamp, A History and Theory of Informed Consent (1986); and
Beauchamp, Principles, supra note 56, at ch. 3.
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irrationality, immaturity, distorted information, or other factors that
can limit their grasp of the situation to which they have the right to give
or withhold consent. Voluntariness, or being free to act in giving
consent, requires that the subjects act in a way that is free from
manipulation and coercion by other persons. Finally, the criterion of
competence demands that potential risk victims give autonomous
authorization to some act, such as approving certain fertility treatment.
Given these elements that scholars recognize as necessary for
informed consent, to claii that women can give free informed consent
to IVF treatment is questionable. If women are ignorant of the fact that
IVF is of unproved benefit for many infertility conditions, and if they
are not aware that the treatment may have unknown risks, then they
cannot give genuinely informed consent. Lack of information may
seriously hinder people's abilities to make informed choices. Some of
the relevant data necessary for insuring free informed consent of
women undergoing IVF include (1) personal chances of having a child
as a result of the treatment; (2) alternatives to the procedure; (3) long-
term effects; (4) emotional demands that the treatment imposes
(timing of sexual relations, frequent visits to the clinic, failing to achieve
a pregnancy); and (5) short-term consequences of the treatment.
According to some recent studies, the majority of IVF patients
surveyed were dissatisfied with information received in these areas.
67
Critics still may argue that it is the individual's responsibility, and
not that of the assessors', to inform themselves about IVF risks and
benefits as fully as possible. IVF evaluators' roles are not to educate
infertile people on the hazards and effectiveness of this procedure but to
analyze the data they consider relevant for policymaking. This
objection is questionable. Government IVF commissions are
fundamental steps in the adoption and implementation of particular
policy decisions. Thus, they are obligated to ensure that inappropriate
or unethical use of IVF is prohibited and that the necessary mechanisms
to protect informed decision making are in place. Furthermore, given
the infertile couples' strong desire to utilize all possible successful
treatments, their ability to give genuinely informed consent could be
compromised. Because of the committees' influence on the approval of
67 See RCNRT, Care, supra note 42, at 547.
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certain public policies, they also have a responsibility to reduce, where
possible, vulnerability in relation to infertility treatments and to ensure
that those who are in positions of power and authority do not
manipulate or control those who are vulnerable. For this reason,
accurate information seems particularly important.
Intefering with Women's Rights to Choose Risky Technologies
A second objection to my analysis of IVF assessments is that
evaluators' sanctioning the use and expansion of IVF under conditions
of uncertainty is adequate.The argument is that by restricting the use of
this procedure, it would interfere with women's abilities to choose a
risky technology, the benefits of which they desire. According to those
who support procreative rights, such interference would be
paternalistic. 68 I argue that criticizing my analysis for encouraging
interference with the implementation and use of IVF, on grounds of
unjustified paternalism, fails. The objection errs because such
interference may not be paternalistic at all or may be a case of justified
paternalism for several reasons. First, women's consent to IVF is not
adequately informed. Second, extensive use of IVF may harm other
members of the community such as children, the poor, and minority
women. I treat these reasons in order.
Philosophers often define "paternalism" as the intentional
overriding of one person's preferences or actions by another individual
or institution under the justification of benefiting or avoiding harm to
the person whose will is overridden. 6 9 Most moral and political
philosophers also agree that paternalistic interventions are sometimes
justified.70 Similarly, they usually distinguish between weak (soft) and
strong (hard) paternalism. 7 1 In weak paternalism, an agent intervenes
on grounds of beneficence or nonmaleficence only to protect people
against their own substantially nonautonomous actions. These actions
68 See, e.g., John Robertson, Children of Choice (1994).
69 See, e.g., Joel Feinberg, Legal. Paternalism, 1 Canadian Journal of Philosophy
105 (1971) (hereinafter Feinberg, Paternalism); Gerard Dworkin, Paternalism, 56
The Monist 64 (1972); Immanuel Kant, On the Old Saw: That May Be Right in
Theory But It Won't Work in Practice (E. B. Ashton trans., 1974); John S. Mill, 18
On Liberty. Collected Works of John Stuart Mill (1977); John Kleinig, Paternalism
(1983); D. Van DeVeer, Paternalistic Intervention (1986); and Beauchamp,
Principles, supra note 56, at 271.
70 See, e.g., Feinberg, Paternalism, supra note 69, at 105.
71 Id.
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include cases of consent that are not adequately informed, severe
depression that precludes rational deliberation, and critical addiction
that precludes free choice and action. Strong paternalism, on the other
hand, involves interventions intended to prevent harm to an individual
despite the fact that the individual's risky actions are informed,
voluntary, and autonomous. 72 The case of IVF constitutes, as we shall
see, a case of weak paternalism.
If the previous discussion of informed consent is correct, then we
cannot say that women's consent to IVF is adequately informed,
because many women appear to lack relevant information on IVF risks
and benefits. Therefore, promoting restrictions on the use of IVF
would be a case of weak paternalism because women cannot give free
informed consent to the procedure. But, that persons deserve to be
protected from harm caused to them by conditions beyond their
control is hardly questionable. 73 If this is so, then evaluators' support
for regulation or restriction of IVF does not constitute a case of strong
or unjustified paternalism, because women are not adequately informed
about the possible hazards to their health or about the likelihood of
becoming pregnant through this procedure.
Second, encouraging interference with women's procreative liberty
by restricting use of IVF may not be paternalistic in the strong sense
because such use may harm others. Certainly, procreative liberty is
extremely important because of the effects that the decision to have or
to refrain from having children may present to our sense of dignity,
identity, and meaning of life.74 However, emphasizing the primacy of
procreative liberty risks overlooking the fact that reproduction clearly
involves the community.7 5 Reproduction always occurs with a partner
and normally requires the collaboration of doctors and nurses.
Moreover, reproduction affects others by creating a new person. In
centering the debate on the right to have children, critics may treat as
72 See Feinberg, Paternalism, supra note 69, at 113, 116; and Beauchamp,
Priniples, supra note 56, at 277.
73 See Joel Feinberg, Harm to Self, The Moral Limits of the Criminal Law (vol.
III, 1986); and Beauchamp, Principles, supra note 56, at 277.
74 See, e.g., Robertson, Choice, supra note 68.
7 See, e.g., Mary A. Glendon, Rights Talk: The Impoverishment of Political
Discourse (199 1); Elizabeth Kingdom, What's Wrong with Rights: Problems for
Feminists Politics of Law (1991).
9 Risk. Health, Safety & Environment 201 [Summer 1998]
irrelevant to moral analysis or public policy the effects of reproductive
choices on women, on offspring, on family, and on society.
Furthermore, restricting IVF and related technologies may not be
paternalistic in the strong sense because these procedures also can affect
other members of the community and the community as a whole by
changing profoundly held values. For example, using IVF techniques, a
child may have up to three mothers: the woman who provides the egg,
the woman who bears the child, and the one who rears her. The impacts
of IVF on children's psychological well being and on society in general
are unforeseen and may be far-reaching. Also, the use of IVF may harm
women as a social group. For example, these medical procedures affect
women as a group by promoting commercialization of reproduction.
Sperm, eggs, embryos, and babies now have become commodities. This
is obvious when the donation of gametes or the use of the uterus (in so-
called "surrogate motherhood") involves profits for the donor.
Exploitation of low-income women would be a clear reality in a system
where gametes, embryos or wombs can be bought and sold.
Participants at the UNESCO 1985 International Symposium (on the
Effects on Human Rights of Recent Advances in Science and
Technology) pointed out the problem of social and racial
discrimination in the case of reproductive medicine. The Conference
recognized that those most at risk from the assisted-conception
procedures are poor, migrant, refugee, or ethnic minority women. Such
risk comes, for example, from the possibility of using them as "Guinea
pigs" in research on these technologies, as producers of eggs, or as
surrogate mothers.76
If using IVF may substantially harm other members of the
community, or women as a whole, then restrictions on this procedure
may not be paternalistic at all or may be justified paternalistic actions.
Certainly, the social consequences of the extensive utilization of IVF
76 See UNESCO, International Symposium on the Effects on Human Rights of
Recent Advances in Science and Technology (1985). See also, Rowland,
Laboratories, supra note 1, at 211-216; R. Koval, The Commercialization of
Reproductive Technology, Baby Machine. Reproductive Technology and the
Commercialization of Motherhood (Jocelynne A. Scutt ed., 1988); and Gena Corea,
Women, Class, and Genetic Engineering. The Effect of New Reproductive
Technologies on all Women, Baby Machine. Reproductive technology and the
Commercialization of Motherhood (Jocelynne A. Scutt ed., 1988).
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and related technologies are far from known. However, when assessing
these procedures, evaluators also should analyze the ways in which
reproductive decisions may alter and reflect all kinds of social forces.
Total freedom to choose a technological option such as IVF may
damage the achievements of liberty for many women, for people living
in poverty, or for disabled people.
Furthermore, in countries with socialized health care such as
Australia, Spain, and the United Kingdom, assessors charged with
evaluating medical technologies have a duty to ensure that their
evaluations do not encourage inefficient use of scarce resources. Not to
do so may harm the public. Because the state's money is always scarce,
decisions about resource allocation may have important ethical,
economic, and political consequences. Encouraging public policies that
use taxpayers money on an inefficient and expensive technology such as
IVF might prevent decisionmakers from spending those same resources
on more beneficial measures.
Summary and Conclusion
Because the Victorian, British, Spanish, and the U.S. reports
influence public policies in relation to infertility treatments, evaluating
their deficiencies is extremely important. Without such assessments,
governments may make decisions that are not in the public's best
interests. This essay has analyzed some of the inadequacies present in
the reports mentioned. I have argued here that IVF assessors have
underestimated the possibility of jeopardizing women's health because
they have neglected epistemological and ethical problems such as
choosing criteria for decisions under uncertainty. I have defended the
thesis that evaluators have erred in their conclusions because, in a
situation of uncertainty with potentially dangerous consequences, they
have condoned the use of IVF. They have preferred to minimize false
positives over false negatives. As a consequence, decisionmakers might
promote policies that underestimate the possibility of endangering
women's health.
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